disclosure, which they found was followed significantly smaller variances in audit fees as predicted for 2001 compared to the variances in 2000. Causholli et al. (2010) observe that "the limited evidence available suggests that audit fees react to changes in the drivers of audit production but slowly and somewhat unpredictably", and suggest that the issue is worthy of further research. Our study examines the response of audit fees to changes in the variables that are usually seen as their determinants, such as size, complexity, and risk, and helps to explain:
-Why the audit fee model does not fully explain the level of audit fees; -Why audit fees are more likely to be too high than too low; -Why lower audit fees suggestive of fee cutting are sometimes observed when clients switch auditors -What managers and audit committees should be concerned about regarding audit fees; and -The extent to which the market for audit services is competitive.
Research on stickiness is well-established in management accounting, and we adapt the methods used in previous studies. The management accounting research studies show that the relation between sales and categories of expenditure (such as selling, general, and administrative costs) is not symmetric for volume increases and decreases. Costs increase more quickly than they decrease (e.g., Anderson, Banker, and Janakiram, 2003) . We adapt the Anderson et al. (2003) model 1 to examine audit fee movements in a large sample of US firms for the period from 2000 to 2008. We use a standard audit fee model to estimate 1 Anderson et al. (2003) show that, when sales decrease, selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) costs decrease by a smaller percentage (0.35 percent when sales decrease by 1 percent) than they increase when there is an increase in sales (0.55 percent when sales increase by 1 percent). They label this phenomenon cost stickiness. Anderson et al. (2003) use sales as a cost driver to explain changes in SG&A costs. In this way, they move away from the usual assumption that costs move proportionately with changes in activities to a model where manager choice in committing to costs (cutting costs) is emphasized. Anderson et al. (2003) also find evidence that stickiness reverses in subsequent periods and that stickiness reduces over longer periods of time (longer than one year).
expected audit fees for each firm-year. Using this audit fee model (with high predictive power shown by R 2 above 0.74) provides a much more accurate estimate of the audit fee expense compared to models in the stickiness literature which rely solely on one variable, sales, to predict expenses, e.g., Anderson et al. (2003) . We then compare actual audit fee movements from year to year with the expected movements predicted by the model, initially considering all movements together and then distinguishing between upward and downward movements. Thus the market for audit services allows us to conduct a more fully developed model of stickiness, because we are able to include more of the determinants of audit fees.
It is important to distinguish between cost stickiness (as examined in the management accounting literature) and price stickiness (as examined in the economics literature). Cost stickiness refers to movements in the total of expenses, which are under the control of the managers in the purchasing firm; whereas price stickiness or audit fee stickiness refers to the price of a single item (in this case the audit fee), which is negotiated between the managers of the firm being audited and the auditor. Therefore, we use the economics-based literature and arguments in our hypotheses development.
Our findings show that, when changes occur to the determinants of audit fees, then audit fees do not change immediately, or symmetrically, to the extent suggested by audit fee models. In particular, upward adjustments are much larger than downward adjustments. This difference between upward and downward adjustments gradually reduces when we examine changes over longer periods of time until the difference becomes insignificant when four year periods are considered. The observation that the upward/downward difference reverses and disappears over time provides evidence that audit markets are competitive in spite of switching costs. Upward adjustments of audit fees are also smaller than expected, suggesting that auditors fail to recognize upward changes soon enough, and thus implying a risk of under-auditing. We find that when clients switch auditors, their audit fees revert more fully to the levels suggested by an audit fee model. These results are all consistent with stickiness that lasts for several periods, but eventually reverses.
The results highlight that managers and audit committees need to apply extra care in managing their audit fees during periods of downturn, because audit fees generally take longer to reduce than to increase. Therefore, our results show the importance for audit committees of initiating audit fee negotiations as soon as firm forecasts indicate a downturn.
In addition, auditors need to be aware of the risks and opportunities associated with changes in the determinants of audit fees, because our results point towards clear opportunities for auditors to increase audit fees sooner, decrease audit fees later, or reduce audit work sooner.
The evidence regarding the competitiveness of the audit market will be of interest to regulators. The audit research community will be interested in the fact that audit fee models can be improved by including the impact of movements in audit fee determinants (by taking account of the previous year's fee). Current audit fee models are based on an implicit assumption that the audit fee is based on audit fee determinants at a point in time, and do not take account of any rigidities or stickiness that influence the level of fees.
The price behavior and stickiness of audit fees are also important for another reason.
Recent papers have examined the effects of events that affect auditors on changes in audit fees. Doogar, Sivadasan, and Solomon (2010) examine the effect over time of changes in the auditing standards (from AS2 to AS5) by comparing actual fees to the fees predicted using a model based on the previous years' fees. Ettredge, Li and Emeigh (2011) determine fee pressure by comparing client audit fees in 2008, the center of the recession, to the estimated benchmark audit fees the companies would have paid in 2008 based on the previous year's audit fee model. Both of these papers examine audit fee behavior over short periods of time, when there is reason to expect change. However, they do not take into account how sticky fees are, i.e. how much fees may be expected to react in general when there are no specific event to examine, in upwards or in downwards directions. Our study provides an indication of the extent to which audit fees can be expected to be sticky, and the differences between upward and downwards changes, that should be useful in further developing studies like Doogar et al. (2010) and Ettredge et al. (2011) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we develop hypotheses, and this is followed by sections where we introduce our regression models; data and results; and conclusion.
Hypotheses
Economic theory predicts price stickiness, among other circumstances, when sellers do not fully understand market conditions. Price stickiness is important in macroeconomics, because it helps to explain why changes in monetary policy take time to have an effect (Ball and Mankiw, 1994) . It has been investigated using catalogues, surveys, and interview studies.
Reasons for stickiness include "menu costs" of implementing new prices. Further investigation shows that menu costs in a literal sense are very small, while management costs are substantial, e.g., deciding on new prices, and convincing customers that they are fair (Ball and Mankiw, 1994, 25; Zbaracki et al., 2004, 514) . Larger increases impose larger costs.
Even price decreases are costly, as they open a "Pandora's box" of customer queries about prices (Zbaracki et al. 2004, 524) . Under conditions of incomplete understanding of market conditions, sellers do not want to risk upsetting buyers with frequent or major price adjustments (Rotemberg, 2002; Zbaracki, Ritson, Levy, Dutta and Bergen, 2004) . Bhaduri and Falkinger (1990) also show that a seller who has imperfect market information will base his/her pricing on cost, and adjust pricing gradually and infrequently. We argue that auditors do not fully understand how clients will react to audit fee changes, i.e. if or when clients will consider switching auditors, and know that fee changes can be costly. Therefore, auditors will base their audit fees on cost and adjust audit fees gradually and infrequently. Audit fee stickiness can therefore be predicted.
Considerable empirical evidence in the economics literature supports the notion of price stickiness (e.g., Carlton, 1986; Levy and Young, 2004) . In the audit fee literature, Ghosh and Lustgarten (2006) show that the explanatory power (or R 2 ) of a standard audit fee model is high when levels are considered, but low when year-on-year differences are used. This result suggests that audit fees do not change in every year by as much as the model would predict.
In a working paper, Ferguson, Lennox and Taylor (2005) also show evidence of stickiness in a sample of UK and Australian audit fees. We test for overall stickiness by examining the extent to which changes in actual audit fees are consistent with predicted changes.
HYPOTHESIS 1. Audit fees do not immediately adjust to the levels suggested by an audit fee model.
In the economics literature, where quality cannot be discerned, price is often used as a proxy for quality (Shapiro, 1983) . This is also the case in the audit fee literature where audit fees are used as a proxy for audit quality (e.g., Craswell et al., 1995) . This appears to be a reasonable assumption given the fact that the Big x audit firms are generally known to charge more and assumed to provide higher quality audits. If clients see higher audit fees as a mark of quality, clients may resist fee increases less than expected and, when fee decreases are appropriate, clients may demand decreases less than expected (Ferguson et al., 2005) .
Furthermore, SOX caused additional risk to client managers, who had to start signing off on the adequacy of controls. Thus, during the period of SOX implementation, clients were likely to be more focused on assuring that adequate audit work was performed than on audit fee management. SOX is one example of a general ratcheting effect of audit regulation over time.
Additional regulation means that audit fees are more likely to increase than to decrease. Anderson et al. (2003) advanced three reasons for the difference between positive and negative changes in costs, namely cost lumpiness, adjustment costs, and agency cost.
However, it can be argued that these reasons do not apply as strongly to the audit setting.
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Given that audit fees are broadly determined by effort and risk, when the audit effort and/or risk for a given client reduces, auditors may not recognize this before they have already committed a planned number of hours to the (interim) audit. By contrast, a larger required audit can, at least to some extent, be adjusted for and accommodated at a later stage in the audit. Therefore, late recognition of a change in the profile of the audit client during a given year will result in audit fee stickiness. This is a short-term effect which can be corrected in time for the next year's audit.
Even when auditors recognize the need for a reduced audit early, cognizant of the cost to the client to switch auditors and the extended timeframe required to do so, auditors can opportunistically reduce the audit fee by a smaller amount. This can be achieved by overauditing (reducing the audit less than is warranted) or by over-charging (reducing the audit sufficiently, but charging more). Over-auditing and over-charging under conditions that call for a reduction in the extent of auditing will result in a different level of adjustment of audit fees in an upwards direction compared to downwards adjustments, i.e., stickiness.
We further argue that audit risk is greater for clients that are decreasing in size (or in the other factors that determine audit fees), than for those that are growing. Firms that are decreasing in size may have risk factors such as impaired assets or reduced viability, which would require more audit work. Growing firms may have an increase in risk but not to the same extent.
Audit fees are often contracted between client and auditor before the commencement of the audit. However, it is customary to have 'escape' clauses that would allow the auditor to perform extra work and to charge for the extra work in case of unforeseen circumstances, e.g., the existence of going concern issues, or other audit risk factors. Audit contracts do not customarily provide for contingencies that would allow the audit fee to be reduced (Palmrose, 1989; Corporate Executive Board, 2005) . These contractual arrangements and the other forces discussed above such as menu costs would cause audit fee increases to be more common than audit fee decreases. We examine the relative magnitude of predicted increases and predicted decreases.
HYPOTHESIS 2. Audit fees decrease less (when a decrease is expected) than they increase (when an increase is expected).
Although we anticipate audit fee stickiness, it is not likely that it will continue indefinitely. Competitive markets force pricing to revert to the norm, i.e. a seller cannot (indefinitely) extract a premium price from a buyer. Market frictions (e.g. incomplete information) cause stickiness (i.e. prices do not change instantaneously), but competition forces the sellers to reduce higher than average prices over time. Alternatively, buyers will switch to less expensive sellers. Either way, the observed transaction price reverts to the norm over time. Specifically, Martin (1993) shows that prices are less sticky if there are more sellers and less collusion between sellers, implying that prices revert to the norm and prices are less sticky in more competitive markets. Several empirical studies support the notion that prices are less sticky (i.e. adjust quicker) in more competitive markets (Carlton, 1986; Weiss, 1993; Hall, Walsh and Yates, 2000) . Anderson et al. (2003) ascribe the reversal of stickiness in subsequent periods to slow manager reactions to downturns and to the fact that it can take time to unwind contractual commitments. If managers and audit committees are slow to recognize a downturn and negotiate their audit fee down, audit fee stickiness will reverse in subsequent periods. It may be that auditors wait to assess whether a change is likely to be permanent. Contractual commitments can also be a factor, because if managers recognize a downturn late, they would not have sufficient time to renegotiate or be able to switch auditors during that period, but might be able to in the subsequent period.
From an auditor point of view, if auditors are late in recognizing the need for a smaller audit, audit fees will be higher in the current period and lower in the subsequent period. Thus, stickiness would reverse in the subsequent period. Alternatively, in a competitive audit market, opportunistic auditors would have to reverse their opportunistic behavior in order to avoid losing the audit. Alternatively, if the auditor does not adjust the audit fee and the client decides to switch auditors for a reduction in audit fees, reversal of audit fee stickiness would also be observed. Anderson et al. (2003) argue that longer periods of time (more than one year) capture complete adjustment cycles and this explains the fact that stickiness reduces over longer periods of time. With audit fees, clients can be expected to manage audit fees down over longer periods of time. If there is a competitive audit market, then auditors would have to adjust their audit fees over time to revert to the norm.
HYPOTHESIS 3. Variations of audit fees from the levels suggested by audit fee models will reverse over longer periods of time.
We examine this issue by considering two sub-hypotheses:
HYPOTHESIS 3(a). The difference between upward and downward adjustments reverses direction in the following year HYPOTHESIS 3(b). The difference between upward and downward audit fee adjustments reduces when time periods longer than one year are considered
Stickiness is partly due to imperfect information, including the seller not fully understanding how the buyer will react to a change in price, i.e. what would cause the buyer to consider switching to a different seller. When a buyer approaches a new seller, the level of uncertainty is reduced, because it is now known that the buyer is considering a switch. Thus one of the sources of market friction that cause price stickiness is removed and the price can thus be expected to more fully revert to the expected level. In evidence, Johnstone, Bedard, and Ettredge (2004, p. 25) find that "in competitive bidding situations there are stronger associations between cost drivers and planned engagement effort", and that in competitive bidding situations higher planned engagement effort is higher and audit fees are lower.
Therefore, it is expected that audit fees will more fully adjust to the norm, i.e. to the levels predicted by an audit fee model, when clients switch auditor. Two aspects specific to the audit market may mitigate this general expectation in different directions. One aspect is the fact that a new client initially requires additional audit work to ensure full knowledge of all audit risks. The other aspect is the possibility that audit firms bid aggressively to acquire a new client (low-balling; e.g., DeAngelo, 1981) with the expectation of being able to raise audit fees gradually later. Because these aspects could influence audit fees of new clients in different directions, we stand by our original (general) expectation, i.e. that audit fees of new clients would more fully adjust to normal levels.
HYPOTHESIS 4. When new auditors are appointed, the audit fee adjusts more fully to levels
suggested by the audit fee model.
Regression models
Following previous audit fee research (Simunic, 1980; Craswell et al., 1995; Ferguson, Francis and Stokes, 2003; Hay et al., 2006; Carson, 2009; Choi et al., 2009; Huang et al. 2009 ), we estimate the following audit fee model separately for each year to calculate the predicted audit fees for each firm for each year.
LAF = ƒ(LTA, LBS, CATA, QUICK, DE, ROI, FORDUM, LOSS)
Variables are defined in Table 1 .
Insert Table 1
We use the general cost stickiness model, following Anderson et al. (2003) and others, but modified for the purpose of measuring the stickiness of audit fees. Specifically, we substitute the cost driver in the general stickiness model with the natural log of the change in the estimated audit fees (derived from model 1 above). We use a simplified configuration, i.e.
one that does not distinguish between positive and negative changes, followed by one that does make this distinction. That is, first:
(where AF represents audit fee and EAF is estimated audit fee, and the measures used are defined as current audit fee divided by previous year's audit fee 
Interpretation: β 1 = the proportion of the expected audit fee adjustment that actual audit fees adjust (for expected upward adjustments) β 1 + β 2 = the proportion of the expected audit fee adjustment that actual audit fees adjust (for expected downward adjustments)
We also use an expanded model, again derived from Anderson et al. (2003) , to examine whether the difference between positive and negative changes starts to reverse in the following year. 
We use these models to test the hypotheses as follows: H1: Using model (2), we predict β 1 to be less than 1 (showing that audit fees adjust by less than 100 percent of the predicted adjustment) H2: Using model (3), we predict β 2 to be significant (showing that negative adjustments are smaller than positive adjustments) H3: Using model (4), we predict β 4 to be positive and significant (showing reversal of the positive/negative difference); and Using model (3), we predict the coefficient for β 2 to become smaller for longer periods when considered over two, three, and four year periods (showing that positive/negative difference reduces over time) H4: Using model (3), we predict that the effects will be less when considered for firms that switched auditors (fees more fully adjust for switching clients)
4 Sample, descriptive statistics, and description of audit fee movements
We obtain annual report data of US firms from Compustat and audit fee data from
Audit Analytics for the period 2000-2008. After excluding firms in the financial sector (SIC 6000-6999) and firms with missing data, the sample size is 30,298 firm-year observations representing 5,568 firms. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for our audit fee model variables. The mean natural log of audit fee is 12.909, which translates to approximately $400,000 3 , and the mean natural log of total assets is 5.375, which translates to about $200 million. The variables appear to be as expected.
Insert Table 2
Table 3 reports the pair-wise Pearson correlations between the variables in our audit fee estimation model. Overall, all the pair-wise correlations among independent variables are relatively small, and not large enough to cause concern (smaller than 0.7), except the largest Pearson correlation coefficient (0.834) between LAF and LTA. This statistic shows, as expected, that the natural log of audit fees and the natural log of total assets are highly correlated with each other. The independent variables are all significantly correlated with the dependent variable (LAF). We also calculate variance inflation factors (VIFs) (untabulated) and these are all less than two, leading us to conclude that multi-collinearity is not a concern.
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Insert Table 3
Audit fee estimation results Table 4 Table 4 5 Audit fee stickiness and hypotheses testing results
Our first test examines Hypothesis 1, which proposes that audit fees do not immediately adjust to the levels suggested by an audit fee model. Table 5 , Column A shows the main results, that audit fees do not fully adjust to the levels suggested by audit fee models.
Specifically, audit fees, on average, adjust less than predicted (only 67.8 percent of the predicted change). We therefore find support for hypothesis 1 that audit fees do not fully adjust to levels suggested by a standard audit fee model.
Insert Table 5
Hypothesis 2 examines whether audit fees decrease less (when a decrease is expected) than they increase (when an increase is expected). Table 5 , Column B shows the relevant results for the purpose of considering Hypothesis 2, that audit fees reduce less than they increase for equal predicted changes. Table 5 shows the Decrease_Dummy * Ln(EAF -t /EAF t−1 ) variable to be significant and therefore provide evidence that audit fees reduce less than they increase. We therefore accept Hypothesis 2. Table 4 ) of the variation in audit fees. Note that upward adjustments also fall short of full adjustment to expected levels (at 77.0 percent).
Hypothesis 3 examines whether variations of audit fees from the levels suggested by audit fee models reverse over longer periods of time. We examine this issue by considering firstly whether the difference between upward and downward adjustments reverses direction in the following year, and then by examining whether the differences between positive and negative differences reduces over time. We further examine H3 by considering whether the difference between positive and negative audit fee adjustments reduces when periods longer than one year are considered in aggregate. Table 5 , Columns D-F show the results of the basic stickiness model, but instead of considering changes in audit fees over a one year period, we aggregate two years (Column D), three years (Column E) and four years (Column F). When two years are aggregated, the stickiness parameter is still highly significant, even though the difference between upward and downward movements in audit fees reduces in the following year (see Hypothesis 3(a) above). However, the size of the stickiness effect is different. On average, audit fees reduce by more, namely 49.9 percent (0.830−0.331, refer to Column D) of the expected reduction over a two year period, compared to 27.8 percent (0.770−0.492, refer to Column B) over a one year period. The size of the difference between the upward and downward adjustment of audit fees reduces when adjustments are assessed over a two-year period.
Over three year periods, the differences between upward and downward adjustments are also highly significant. However, audit fees reduce by 61.1 percent (0.847−0.236, refer to Column E) of their estimated reduction over three years, compared to 49.9 percent over two years and 27.8 percent over one year. Taken together, these results provide evidence that audit fee stickiness reduces over time. Therefore, we find evidence in support of Hypothesis 3(b). These results can be interpreted as evidence that the audit market is competitive over the medium term and that auditors cannot maintain a situation where they over-audit or over-charge for more than a few years.
Our fourth hypothesis examines whether, when new auditors are appointed, the audit fee adjusts more fully to levels suggested by the audit fee model. We identify clients that switch auditors. With the demise of Arthur Andersen, Andersen clients were forced to switch to other auditors. Initially, therefore we exclude these forced switches and examine only nonAndersen clients that switched auditors. Refer to Table 5 , Column G. The results show less stickiness, with increases averaging 97.7 percent (suggesting a lack of stickiness) and decreases averaging 50.9 percent of the expectation, i.e. less sticky than the general result of 27.8 percent in Table 5 , Column B. Our results show that increases are larger when clients switch auditor and thus, on average, we do not find evidence consistent with fee cutting or low-balling in circumstances when audit fees are expected to increase. Our results show that decreases are larger when clients switch auditors, consistent with fees readjusting when there is a switch. This phenomenon is also suggestive of fee cutting or low balling and may be the cause of some common beliefs that fee-cutting and low-balling occur. The results lend weight to our overall argument that the audit market is competitive, albeit that there are client switching costs. Cognizant of this, auditors may change their audit fees more slowly than warranted when auditors judge that their clients are not considering a change.
Robustness
We conducted robustness tests examining the effects on our results of different periods (discussed in this paragraph), and other issues that could affect the results (in the subsequent paragraph). There is reason to believe that there may be changes in the audit market over time, including in the period we examine, particularly due to the impact of the SarbanesOxley Act (SOX). SOX has had a major impact on audit fees, particularly during the 2003 and 2004 years. SOX dramatically increased risks to directors; therefore, during the early years of SOX implementation, the focus of audit committees might have been more on ensuring adequate audit procedures to address the risks than on managing audit fees.
Therefore, during the years while SOX was being implemented, audit fee stickiness may have behaved differently. The period we investigate also covers sub-periods of economic expansion and of recession. Audit fees may reduce more readily during recessions than during expansions. To examine these issues, Table 6 Table 6 shows the downward adjustment percentage in the post-SOX period to be 24.6 percent (0.749−0.503), close to the downward adjustment in the full period (27.8 percent, see Table 5 , Column B). Note that increases in the post-SOX period are also similar at 74.9 percent of the expected increase, compared to 77.0 percent for the full period. Whether audit fee stickiness applies in other periods than those that we have examined is an interesting question for future research.
Insert Table 6 We perform several other robustness tests and report the results in columns in Tables 7 to 9. Table 8 shows robustness tests that examine data excluding small audit fee adjustments (under 5 percent); Big 4 clients only; data excluding companies for which data is not available for the entire period; data excluding clients who switch auditors; and switching clients including forced switches by ex-Andersen clients. In the first five columns, we use the original, full-sample audit fee estimation models reported in Table 4 and in the last four columns we use re-estimated audit fee model results based on the exclusions in the robustness check. We show these re-estimated audit fee model results in Table 7 .
Insert Table 7 Insert Table 8 The results of these robustness tests are generally qualitatively similar to our main results, i.e. upward adjustments are smaller than expected; downward adjustments are smaller as a percentage of the expected change than upward adjustments; and adjustments are bigger for clients that switch auditors. The results excluding small adjustments show that our results are not primarily driven by large numbers of small audit fee adjustments. Further analysis also shows that Big4 audit fees are sticky; and that our results are not driven by firms that cease operations during the period (and that may have unique characteristics).
Finally, Table 9 (Columns A and B) shows results when the stickiness model is based on an audit fee model estimated over the entire period instead of year-by-year. The results are generally consistent with and qualitatively similar to our main results. We also report different specifications of the stickiness model (Columns C to F), using untransformed values of AF t /AF t−1 and using AF t. . The results are again consistent and qualitatively similar. Note column F where we use the normal stickiness model with the Decrease_dummy added, thereby effectively allowing reductions in estimated audit fees to find their own intercept (0.041+0.011=0.052). This result is also qualitatively similar.
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Insert Table 9 Heteroscedasticity To ensure that heteroscedasticity does not confound our results, we re-estimate our main stickiness analysis (i.e. the result tabulated in Table 5 , Column B) using White's correction. The results are qualitatively similar, i.e. audit fees do not fully adjust in the upward direction and adjust less in the downward than in the upward direction. We also use White's test with and without cross-products and do not find evidence of heteroscedasticity or misspecification.
Conclusion
We find evidence that audit fees are sticky, i.e. they do not fully adjust to the levels predicted by a standard audit fee model. Audit fees also go up more quickly than they come down. We further observe that increases in audit fees are not as much as expected and appear to stabilize around 86 percent of the expected increase over a four year observation period.
We also find that the difference between upward and downward audit fee adjustments reduces in the second year and when longer periods of time are aggregated. This can be explained as follows: if year one and year two is considered together, upward and downward adjustments are still different, but to a lesser extent. The difference between upward and downward adjustments disappears when four year periods are examined. Audit fees of clients switching auditors adjust to levels closer to our audit fee model prediction than audit fees of non-switching clients. We show our results to be generally robust, including when considering the post-SOX period (after 2004) . The only exception is that we do not find significant differences between upward and downward audit fee movements during the period from 2000-2003, a period when the audit fee market was particularly competitive (Palepu and Healy, 2003) and which was a recessionary period. However, this result suggests that further testing of other periods and other audit fee markets will be of value.
These findings suggest that auditors may be strategic in their pricing or may not recognize reductions in audit requirements as easily or quickly as they recognize increased requirements. The findings that the difference between upward and downward fee movements becomes smaller in the following period, and gradually disappears (at four years) when longer periods of time are aggregated, suggest that the audit market is competitive, because auditors are not able to maintain strategic pricing over the medium term. The finding that the audit fees of clients switching auditors more fully adjust to the audit fee levels predicted by the audit fee model provides further evidence of the competitiveness of the audit market (and the absence of wide-spread low-balling).
Our study helps to explain why the audit fee model does not fully explain the level of audit fees, because it does not take account of fee stickiness and the influence of previous fees. 6 It examines why audit fees are more likely to be too high than too low, which occurs because there is greater stickiness creating resistance to reductions in fees than there is creating resistance to increases. We examine why fee cutting is sometimes observed when clients switch auditors. The commonly-observed occurrence of reduced fees when clients switch auditors might be partly due to a reduction in stickiness at the time of the switch due to a reduction in market friction related to the auditor's uncertainty regarding the client's reaction to audit pricing at that time (of switching), and not necessarily low-balling. We observe evidence of fee cutting only when audit fees are expected to reduce, according to our audit fee model, and not when audit fees are expected to increase. We conclude that the market for audit services is competitive, because over periods of time longer than one year, the difference between upward and downwards adjustments in audit fees eventually becomes insignificant over four year periods. Our study helps to highlight these issues, which managers and audit committees should be concerned about regarding audit fees. Our findings add to understanding in the areas of competitiveness of the audit fee market; helping managers and auditors understand how audit fees change, and the extent to which they react to changing circumstances; and extending the stickiness literature to a single item of expense.
In addition, our findings will be important to consider in future studies of events that have an impact on auditing, as researchers will be able to consider how quickly audit fees react to changes. Our results are robust to a range of exclusions and persist under all conditions we tested, including in cases where clients change auditors.
Our findings provide evidence useful to managers and audit committees when managing their audit fees, auditors when considering the risks and opportunities associated with changes in the determinants of audit fees, and regulators concerned with the 6 We estimate an audit fee model similar to our model (1), but with the addition of the prior year audit fee as an additional independent variable. This model can only be used as a predictive model due to multicollinearity concerns. The R 2 of this new model was 0.856 as against 0.747 without the prior year audit fee (see the first column of Table 4 ). competitiveness of the audit market. The stickiness of audit fees is also relevant to researchers examining the effect over time of changes in auditing standards or economic conditions. Such studies need to take into account whether audit fees are sticky, and how long it takes for changes to be reflected in audit fees.
We only consider the US market for audit services for the period 2000-2008. Further research in other markets and considering different time periods may shed further light on the generalizability of our results. Further research could also investigate the potential for our stickiness approach to improve existing audit fee models, examine increases/decreases in audit market competitiveness, and use different research approaches to examine behavioral aspects around audit fee stickiness. For example, surveys, interviews and case studies could focus on both auditors' and clients' behavior and considerations during the setting of and the negotiation of audit fees. 
